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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 07-2970
            
VINCENT L. DiCESARE,
                                       Appellant
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 05-cv-02554)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 24, 2008
Before:  SLOVITER, BARRY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed July 2, 2008)
_____
 OPINION
         
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Vincent DiCesare appeals the District Court’s order affirming the denial of his
application for disability benefits (“SSD”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”)
under the Social Security Act.  He contends that he has multiple severe impairments that
prevented him from doing any substantial gainful work.
I.
DiCesare, who is now 65 years old, alleges that he was disabled as of February 5,
1996.  Prior to his alleged disability, DiCesare was employed as an insurance agent.  He
left his job in 1993, citing depression.  DiCesare had been diagnosed with major
depressive disorder in 1993, which resulted in short term disability.  A later psychological
evaluation determined that his problems were mostly physical, that he suffered no thought
disorder, and had adequate social relations. 
In February 1996, he was involved in a car accident resulting in injuries to his
neck, lower back, left arm, and left shoulder.  DiCesare was diagnosed with a shoulder
muscle strain and back sprains and strains with preexisting degenerative disease.  A later
MRI also revealed a small herniated disc and a mild cervical spondylosis.  In support of
his disability claim, DiCesare cites persistent pain in his neck, back, left arm, and left
shoulder.  Despite taking over-the-counter pain medication, he contends it is difficult for
him to lift or bend, and to walk, sit, or stand for prolonged periods.  The date DiCesare
was last insured for SSD was December, 1999.  As DiCesare notes, if he was not disabled
 We have jurisdiction to review a final decision of the1
Social Security Commissioner following appeal to the District
Court.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Our review is plenary with respect to
legal issues, and the ALJ’s findings of fact are entitled to deference
if supported by substantial evidence.  Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247
F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001).
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before that date, he is limited to SSI, which uses the same standard for disability.
In October 2001, DiCesare was diagnosed with coronary disease and underwent
heart surgery.  Following his 2001 heart surgery, DiCesare’s cardiac condition was stable
and he was placed on regular medication. 
II.
Applying the five-step sequential evaluation codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that DiCesare’s severe impairments did not
establish a disability under the Commissioner of Social Security’s Listing of Impairments. 
In assessing DiCesare’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ concluded that, prior to his
heart surgery, DiCesare was capable of performing his past work as an insurance agent. 
The ALJ found that following his 2001 heart surgery, DiCesare could not return to his
past work but had the residual functional capacity to perform other sedentary work that
would utilize his existing skills.  The District Court held that these conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence.  1
DiCesare argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the relevant analysis by relying
on his own medical judgment and summarily rejecting the Commissioner’s Listing of
4Impairments as a basis for finding disability.  To the contrary, the ALJ considered various
medical records, as well as the testimony of DiCesare and his witness in reaching the step
three determination.  Our precedent requires that there be “sufficient explanation to
provide meaningful review of the step three determination.”  Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).  The record is sufficiently developed here and leads us to
conclude that the ALJ properly considered the available evidence in determining that
DiCesare did not meet the requirements for a listed impairment.
DiCesare also challenges the ALJ’s findings with regard to steps four and five.  In
this context, the ALJ questioned DiCesare about his past work, evaluated the medical
evidence, referred to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (or “grids”), and considered the
testimony of a vocational expert.  Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that, prior to
his heart surgery in 2001, DiCesare was capable of returning to his prior work as an
insurance agent.  The light nature of this work would have accommodated DiCesare’s
then-existing limitations.  Following his 2001 heart surgery, DiCesare’s limitations
persisted, and in some instances, worsened.  The ALJ considered the change in
DiCesare’s condition and a vocational expert testified specifically as to the availability of
other work.  Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that after the 2001 heart surgery,
DiCesare would have been restricted to more sedentary work, which was available in
significant numbers in the national and regional economy.  Specifically, the ALJ found
that DiCesare could have performed less demanding insurance-related work.  The
 DiCesare also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his2
credibility.  To the contrary, the ALJ found DiCesare’s  description
of his injuries and restrictions “fully persuasive.”  A. R. at 17.  The
ALJ appropriately considered DiCesare’s testimony in conjunction
with all of the evidence presented.  His argument is therefore
without merit.
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availability of such work would permit him to exercise his existing skill even in light of
his limitations.
III.
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion
that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.  See Simmonds v.
Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that the question for this court is not
whether the ALJ could have reached a different decision given the evidence, but whether
substantial evidence supported his conclusions).2
In addition, DiCesare argues that the ALJ erred at step five by totally relying on
the grids.  This argument is without merit.  The Commissioner is “responsible for
providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers in the
national economy,” which the claimant can perform given his residual functional
capacity.  20 C.F.R. §  404.1560(c)(2).  In light of the testimony of the vocational expert
as to the availability of other work and DiCesare’s own testimony as to his relevant skills,
we conclude that the Commissioner carried his burden at step five.
________________
IV.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
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